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Government officials and politicians have been both a help and hindrance in the public 
dissemination of information during the COVID-19 pandemic. The intervention of a president and 
his/her ministries with their political and economic interests is particularly problematic when they 
employ a tactical approach rather than provide accurate and effective disaster information. This 
paper utilizes a political-economy approach to analyze the link between COVID-19 communication 
policies and practices with the interests of politics and market stability in Indonesia. In this paper, 
the author drills into the extent to which the country’s president and ministries manage their 
political interests in times of global pandemic. The ways they interact with the public during 
various stages of disaster are crucial because society is severely disrupted, with the government 
serving as the sole actor. This study uses qualitative methods and all materials are managed from 
an extensive review of current literature, policy analysis, and field observation.  This paper finds 
that Indonesian government communication during the COVID-19 pandemic period (February–
June 2020) has been dominated by a desire to maintain a strong power of the ruling authority and 
to secure market stability. Two factors—pro-market communication policies and manufactured-
politicized COVID-19 data—have occurred. This paper contributes to the literature by focusing 
on the political and economic approach over the mediated discourses surrounding the pandemic.
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Introduction
The history of epidemics and pandemics 
has been replete with competing interests. 
When health and social recovery become 
political decisions, they may be manipulated 
and are often energized by primordial politics 
(for instance, right-wing politicians’ calls 
for policing European countries’ national 
borders following increased non-European 
migration) (Cherkaoui, 2020). During the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, political 
policies in Europe and the US have promoted 
isolationism and ‘closed doors’. Pro-Trump 
Americans and Euroskeptics are capitalizing on 
the fear of COVID-19 to impose more barriers 
and border security, while right-wing populist 
politicians have argued that COVID-19 shows 
the need to protect national borders. Cherkaoui 
(2020) noted, the virus has been portrayed as 
‘foreign’, and as such walls have been built 
and international flights have been stopped in 
response. 
The 2019 novel coronavirus disease (2019-
nCoV, more widely known as COVID-19), 
caused by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), is a global health 
emergency of unprecedented proportions. The 
ongoing loss of life, articulated differently 
within individual nations, as well as the virus’s 
ability to spread rapidly through communities 
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due to asymptomatic carriers, has generated a 
need for risk-based communication strategies 
as a political action (Quinn, 2018). 
To deal with the global pandemic and its 
far-reaching political-economic implications, 
political leaders have sought to persuade 
the public to voluntarily comply with costly 
preventive measures (Gerstenfeld, 2020; 
Sparkes et al., 2019). Governments’ issuing of 
orders to reduce contact between individuals, 
as well as their communications about the 
severity with which individuals should treat 
the rapidly spreading disease and adhere 
to preventive measures, are particularly 
influential when dealing with a novel disease 
for which there is limited information. Where 
political actors lack credibility and situational 
awareness, complex and non-health crises 
often follow (McLean & Ewar, 2015). A critical 
analysis of the linkages between government 
communications (competencies and strategies) 
and their political-economic agendas is thus 
crucial, as will be discussed here.
In Indonesia, the government’s denial, 
reluctance, and alarm in responding to the 
coronavirus crisis between February and May 
2020 has led to a series of public controversies. 
The uncertainty of data regarding COVID-19 
fatalities, due to poor database management 
and conflicting data from top officials and 
experts, has resulted in uncertainty in action. 
For instance, the government has officially 
identified 1,706 COVID-19 cases in Jakarta; 
however, most Indonesian scientists estimate 
that the capital has seen 32,000 cases, and thus 
the government has only published 2.3% of 
the actual number of cases (Kompas.com, 2020 
April 4). Media observers criticize the lack of 
transparency in COVID-19 reporting as well as 
state-funded recovery programs. 
On March 10, 2020, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) formally recommended 
that Indonesian authorities declare COVID-19 
a national emergency, regarding the standard 
risk communication that had been applied for 
past pandemics such as the SARS and H1N1 
outbreaks ( Jakarta Post, 2020 March 14). 
However, the regime denied this request, citing 
social, political, and economic reasons. Instead, 
Jokowi and Minister of Health Terawan Agus 
Putranto choose to slow the publication of 
COVID-19 data. 
Surveying the political communication 
of President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Center for 
Research, Education, and Publication of 
Social and Economic Issues (Wijayanto, 2020) 
found several blunders. This study found 
that between 1 January and 5 April 2020, the 
government had made 37 mistaken statements 
concerning the virus in mainstream media. 
Take, for instance, Coordinating Minister of 
the Economy Airlangga Hartarto’s joking 
statement that the virus would not enter 
Indonesia owing to the country’s complicated 
licensing laws. 
On social  media,  supporters and 
opponents of the regime have actively turned 
all issues into partisan squabbles, framing 
extremely serious discussions about disaster 
prevention as a shallow and nauseating 
political spectrum. For instance, social media 
users have been engaged in a heated debate 
over whether Indonesia should impose a total 
or partial lockdown to “flatten the curve” of the 
infection (Hermawan, 2020). Are these verbal 
blunders merely technical issues, or are they 
part of a political and economic scenario to 
build an image of a strong government facing 
the global pandemic?
Complex global health risks such as 
climate change, terrorism, and pandemics 
(for example, SARS, Ebola & H1N1) have 
become important topics in academia. When 
observing pandemics, communication scholars 
in Indonesia have frequently employed the 
theoretical approach of crisis communication 
and provided practical evaluations; a political-
economic approach, as used in many developed 
economies such as Germany, Singapore, 
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Taiwan, and Canada (Dickmann et al., 2014; 
Hsu et al., 2017; J et al., 2013; Menon & Goh, 
2005; Michelle Driedger et al., 2018; Sparkes 
et al., 2019; Winseck, 2016), has been lacking. 
This paper is an effort to link the state’s 
communication strategies with the macro-
political and economic agendas of the regime. 
With those backgrounds in mind, this 
study wants to answer these two research 
questions: what are Jokowi’s communication 
related-policies to tackling the COVID-19 
p a n d e m i c ?  W h a t  f a c t o r s  d e t e r m i n e 
communication policies from the political-
economic perspective?
This paper is ordered as follows: First, 
it discusses the conceptual debate regarding 
the political economy of risk communication. 
Second, it describes the method used for this 
study. Third, it explores the main findings of 
this study concerning several controversial 
policies and public issues. Fourth, it provides 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The Political Economy of Risk Communication
The application of the political-economic 
(PE) approach to communication and media 
studies was popularized by scholars such as 
Hardy, (2014); Herman & Chomsky, (2000); 
Mosco, (2004). The central argument of the 
approach is that all communication policies and 
practices address the political and economic 
agenda of those in power. The use of the PE 
approach for this study is relevant in the sense 
that it does not merely explore the practices 
of communication, but can also examine the 
presence of non-public oriented interests 
through how communications are organized 
during the crisis. Moreover, the approach does 
not just map policies, but critically evaluates 
them as well. 
This study precisely uses critical political 
economy, a critical thought rooted within 
Marxist traditions with special attention to 
the use of regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur, 
(2009) in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Levi-Faur argues that regulatory processes 
and outputs shape the operation, manipulation 
and deployment of political and economic 
powers. Mosco (2009), meanwhile, surveys 
a broad range of approaches to political 
economy and suggests that, when discussing 
communication policies and practices, the main 
lines of development are variations on Marxist 
political economy. In this sense, Marx’s class 
state thesis can be used to mark the capitalistic 
orientation of political powers’ policies (Fuchs 
& Mosco, 2016) favoring economic elites over 
ordinary people.
In the sense that disasters are political 
events (Olson & Gawronski, 2010), critical 
political economy was used in the study 
to observe risk communication strategies 
applied by Indonesian authorities during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. McLean & Ewar, 
(2015) argue that dissemination of public 
information is a political decision involving 
state authorities as key actors. Political elites 
not only consider the short-term interest of 
maintaining social stability but also their 
political careers. Public statements regarding 
COVID-19, and communication policies used 
by President Jokowi, for instance, can be seen 
as a political action to maintain power until the 
2024 election. 
German Neo-Marxists, such as Jurgen 
Habermas in his  book The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), have 
concerned themselves with the communications 
of governments that have been critically eroded 
by commercial forces. According to Habermas, 
the public statements delivered by authorities 
are not neutered, just neglected, manipulated, 
or squandered.  
The crises such as COVID-19 have triggered 
an extraordinary increase in information flow. 
The public wants to know what is happening, 
what needs to be done, and demands that 
official institutions provide statements that 
are consistent, open, and accurate; if not, 
the information vacuum will be filled by 
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false information disseminated either out of 
ignorance or malicious intent (Coombs, 2008). 
As mentioned by Seneviratne et al., (2010), 
there is a need for risk communication strategy 
with a strong communication leadership in 
every technical statement. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) 
defines risk communication as follows: “the 
real-time exchange of information, advice and 
opinions between experts or officials, and people 
who face a threat (hazard) to their survival, 
health or economic or social well-being” (Xiang 
et al., 2017). Risk communication thus has two 
main components: form and content. Form is the 
speed, consistency, and openness with which 
information is conveyed, while content refers 
to the information conveyed itself (Coombs, 
2008). Referring to McLean & Ewar (2015), 
communication policy is central and it requires 
an empathy towards victims, as well as basic 
economic resources. Referring to the Ministry 
of Health of the United Kingdom, Menon & 
Goh, (2005) identify risk communication as 
having four principles in which state officials 
play a key role: undertaking agenda-setting 
by framing statements in specific contexts 
(comparison, analogy) and helping people 
develop life expectancies; providing open case 
data, accompanied by supporting evidence for 
each event and action; showing information 
on actions and results; and treating public 
anxiety seriously, even when that anxiety is 
unwarranted. 
Campos & Reich (2019) identified six 
categories of stakeholders that are likely to 
influence health communication crises and 
the subsequent recovery stage: interest group 
politics, bureaucratic politics, budget politics, 
leadership politics, beneficiary politics, and 
external actor politics. For this paper, the author 
has chosen two aspects: bureaucratic politics 
and budget politics. The former examines the 
relationship among different state agencies 
responsible for health issues such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Different agencies may attempt to capture 
political communication policies as a means 
of protecting and expanding their authority, 
budget, or general influence (Sparkes et al., 
2019). As a result, conflict, negotiation, and 
compromise can influence actual government 
policies and actions. It can also push for 
shifts in the governance of the relationships 
between those agencies. Budget politics 
focuses on budget allocation and expenditure 
mechanisms, as well as their impact on policy 
implementation. It explicitly acknowledges 
that resource mobilization and allocation at the 
national and local levels are inherently political 
processes. It also explicitly recognizes that 
the commitment of heads of state determines 
the political benefits and costs of actions and 
thereby influences the sustainability of rule. 
Government communication is always 
an interesting object of study due to involved 
institutions and actors’ power to select strategies 
for managing national crises (Seneviratne et al., 
2010). Public and/or government communication 
consists of related policies, statements delivered 
regularly to the public, and models of 
communicative actions, including the format and 
content of policies that manage communication 
practices, mandate spokespersons, select media 
publications, and involve non-authoritative 
communication leaders such as army officers 
and social media influencers. Learning from 
Singapore’s experience managing the SARS 
pandemic in 2004 (Menon & Goh, 2005), 
two factors are important: transparency in 
pandemic data and the involvement of a single 
and authoritative public communicator in 
communicating government agendas. 
Research into the politics of disaster has 
taken various approaches; in this paper, the 
author drills into the extent to which political 
actors manage their political and economic 
interests in times of global pandemic. The 
ways political actors interact with the public 
during various stages of disaster are crucial 
because society is severely disrupted, with the 
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government serving as the sole actor. Disasters 
usually become increasingly politicized as 
impacted citizens move from the emergency 
response phase through to the recovery and 
reconstruction (Olson & Gawronski, 2010). 
The recovery phase has particularly significant 
implications for politicians, as it is a time when 
both victims and the public expect a diligent 
response from the authorities. 
Finally, examining the non-health 
orientation of public policies, Xiang et al., 
(2017) details a number of problems with risk 
communication in a disaster period: (1) political 
leaders are not transparent; (2) the media are 
not always the primary sources of awareness 
about the dangers of disease; (3) crises of 
scientific evidence presented by authorities in 
official statements and informative messages 
such as logistical availability, vaccine safety 
guarantees (Vaughan & Tinker, 2009). In this 
context, the political economy perspective pays 
close attention to several factors: who controls 
the information, who owns the data, and how 
the data is communicated (McChesney, 2012). 
Data communication is not always neutral and 
objective.
As of May 20, 2020, Indonesia has reported 
19,189 cases, including 4,575 recoveries and 
1,242 deaths (Covid19.go.id). During this 
crisis, Jokowi’s risk communication has not 
been focused on health issues. When the 
pandemic began in Wuhan, China, Indonesia 
showed little concern, stating that victims of 
the virus could recover on their own. Even 
after President Jokowi announced the first 
local case of COVID-19 on March the  3, 2020, 
the information crisis continued (Winanti 
& Mas’udi, 2020). The central government 
reported different data of victims, while various 
agencies appointed their own ‘spokespersons’ 
and used different approaches to dealing with 
the crisis.
Drawing from the above concepts and 
raw data from the current study, the research 
proposition is structured as follows: 
The figure above shows areas of political-
economic interests in COVID-19 communication 
policies in Indonesia. They represent two 
waves of the non-health/non-public interest 
policy orientation: pro-market COVID-19 
through a series of regulatory production 
and political stability as pre-condition of the 
market/economic stability during the global 
crisis. The four sectors above: Communication-
related Policies of COVID-19, manufactured 
data dissemination; involvement of social 
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media buzzers; and dominance of top national 
security officers were used as a framework and 
guide for the author to arrange and organize 
the findings in the present study. 
Methods
This article is based on a study about 
how uncertainties in governmental risk 
communication were not only caused by 
the incompetence of communicators but 
also steered by the macro-political economic 
goals of the ruling government. A qualitative 
approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) was chosen 
since it enabled the examination of the way 
state communication strategies are created 
and oriented. The study focuses on several 
strategies for governmental communication 
(including COVID-19 related policies, public 
statements, spokespersons, etc.). Extensive 
reviews of literary sources, policies, and field 
observations were conducted to collect study 
data.  
This paper, generally, examines whether 
the communication strategies employed 
by Jokowi’s political administration were 
influenced by his political interest to secure 
strong control and market stability. In doing 
so, the author conducted several steps of the 
qualitative research method. In the beginning, 
a previous study conducted by LP3ES on 
Indonesian state officials’ blunders was 
used as the initial reference, followed by an 
analysis of the content of selected statements 
regarding public issues. Going forward, several 
controversial policies regarding COVID-19 
(i.e. (1) Government Regulation (PP) on Large-
Scale Social Restrictions, which stipulates 
that large-scale social restrictions must be 
approved by the central government before 
being enacted; (2) Presidential Decree on Public 
Health Emergency; and (3) Regulation in Lieu 
of Law (PERPPU) No. 1 of 2020 concerning 
the stability of the state financial system (BBC, 
2020 May 12)) were assessed. The informal 
observation was conducted to understand the 
media’s exposure of COVID-19 and to see how 
the political authorities deliver their speeches. 
To gain the perspectives of media 
professionals about government communication 
policies, several senior journalists were 
interviewed, among them were the Chairman 
of the Alliance of Indonesian Journalists 
(AJI) Abdul Manan and the managing editor 
of Kompas.com, Heru Margianto. A mix 
of document collection and analysis, field 
observations, and the interviews ensure both 
validity and depth of the present study.
The choice of critical PE in this paper as an 
analytical tool contributes to a current lack of 
research on the macro level of communication 
practices driving governments’ response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, there is a 
paucity of research into a particular national 
communication crisis as well as interactions 
between political/economic narratives and 
health narratives. Strategic narratives and 
the pandemic have yet to receive substantive 
investigation in Indonesia. Since January 
2020, robust academic publications have 
emerged from such medical disciplines as 
virology, immunology, epidemiology, and 
bioinformatics. Unfortunately, there has been 
little to no scholarly work emerging from non-
medical disciplines. 
Results
This section explores the findings of 
this study about two issues: pro-market 
communication policies during the COVID-19 
pandemic in Indonesia and manufacturing the 
COVID-19 pandemic data.
Pro-Market Communication Policies
It is important to note that no formal, 
specific, and textual COVID-19 communication 
policy has been produced by President Jokowi. 
Rather, the policies discussed in the current 
article are embedded into broader policies 
on managing the pandemic. All policies are 
seen as tools of communication and evidence 
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of government’s concern for the pandemic. 
During the period of January-June 2020, 
numerous government policies were issued 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic as 
provided below: 
Based on the table above, three policies 
that had been enacted by May 31, 2020, serve 
as the focal point of the study, namely: (1) 
Government Regulation (PP) on Large-Scale 
Social Restrictions, which stipulates that large-
scale social restrictions must be approved 
by the central government before being 
enacted; (2) Presidential Decree on Public 
Health Emergency; and (3) Governmental 
Regulation in Lieu of Law (PERPPU) No. 1 
of 2020 concerning the stability of the state 
financial system (BBC, 2020 May 12). The 
PERPPU, passed on May 18, 2020, was widely 
criticized by civil society and challenged in the 
Constitutional Court for granting state officials 
the exclusive right to spend money without 
parliamentary approval. 
When the threat of the COVID-19 
pandemic was first recognized in January 
2020, the Indonesian government’s policy 
seemingly favored promoting economic 
stability over anticipating health problems. 
Some instances include, Jokowi stimulating 
the tourism industry, allocating funds for 
influencers, encouraging citizens to travel, 
etc. The Minister of Health, Terawan Agus 
Putranto, underestimated the virus by saying 
the positive cases would recover on their own, 
and that it was most important to remain fit and 
to continue to pray (Wijayanto, 2020). When 
the first cases of COVID-19 were reported in 
Depok, West Java, on March 2, 2020, President 
Jokowi began to realize that the situation 
was more than a mere economic crisis. Only 
then did he announce the case directly to the 
public and urge Indonesians to maintain social 
distance.
In terms of budget, the Ministry of Health 
has only received a budget allocation of IDR 
75 trillion, while a total of IDR 405 trillion 
has been allocated for restoring the national 
economy—nearly 20 percent of the 2020 state 
budget of 2,540 trillion (Rizky, 2020). This 
stimulus package is focused on community 
health insurance, social safety net programs 
for people in need, and incentive packages 
to ensure the sustainability of small-scale 
enterprises’ economic activities. The IDR 255 
trillion in state expenditure for COVID-19 
Table 1.
 Controversial Policies on the COVID-19 Pandemic
Policy Level Issue
Presidential decree No. 7/2020 on the task force 
to accelerate prevention of the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19)
President Governor, Regent, and/or City Mayor as the leader 
of the regional task force may create policies with 
the approval of the central government. 
Presidential decree No. 11/2020 on the 
declaration of national health emergency during 
the COVID-19 pandemic
President Advancing strict political control by reason of the 
COVID-19 health crisis
Presidential decree No. 12/2020 on the 
declaration of national non-natural disaster due 
to COVID -19
President Advancing strict political control by reason of the 
COVID-19 health crisis
Governmental Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 
1/2020 on the financial policy to stabilize the 
national budget and financial system in coping 
with CORONA
President Showing priority of budget protection by reason 
of national economic stability
Decree of the Minister of Transportation No. 
18/2020 on the public transportation management 
to address the transmission of the Coronavirus
Ministry Policy on the use of all public and personal vehicles, 
physical distancing, limitation of passengers. 
It applies to all types of vehicles incl. logistic 
transports. 
Source: compilation of documents
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mitigation has been aimed at three groups. 
Approximately IDR 75 trillion has been 
allocated for handling the pandemic, such as 
by providing medical devices and incentives 
to medical personnel; a total of IDR 110 trillion 
has been allocated for social safety nets; and 
IDR 70.1 trillion has been allocated for business 
(industry), including general tax subsidies 
(Rizky, 2020). This indicates that IDR 150 
trillion of all expenditures has been allocated to 
support Small and Medium Enterprises (Usaha 
Kecil dan Menengah).
‘Manufacturing’ and Politicizing the Pandemic
The term ‘manufactured’ refers to the 
seminal book Manufacturing Consent: The 
Political Economy of the Mass Media (1998), 
written by Edward S. Herman and Noam 
Chomsky. With this term, the author sees 
communication practices (i.e. manufacturing 
victims’ identities) as tools for ‘manufacturing 
public perceptions’ of the pandemic. During 
February and June 2020, it was evident when 
the central government manufactured and 
politicized pandemic data in several ways; the 
predominance of military elites in COVID-19 
public communication; and the use of social 
media buzzers. 
In delivering statistical data regarding 
victims, authorities have used many terms that 
not only classify victims but also present the 
government as being politically in control of 
the pandemic. This has included: (1) classifying 
victims as people under monitoring (orang dalam 
pemantauan/ODP), patients under monitoring 
(pasien dalam pemantauan/PDP), and infected 
persons; (2) the use of the euphemism ‘large-scale 
social restrictions’ instead of the popular term in 
public: ‘lockdown’; (3) the distinction between 
the terms ‘homecoming’ (pulang kampung) and 
‘going home’ (mudik). 
The use of multiple acronyms for 
identifying victims, can be seen not only 
as helping citizens become aware of actual 
conditions and societal positions, but also as 
a product of manufacturing real data. The 
government seeks to explain the real situation 
in the country while maintaining Indonesia’s 
‘normal ranking’ (32 of 215 countries) in the 
global victim distribution—which it had 
done so successfully as of late May 2020 
(Worldometer, 2020).
This study also found the lack of real, 
transparent data on the pandemic and recent 
developments. For instance, official government 
data indicated that 765 people had died of 
COVID-19 in Indonesia, while the international 
media association Reuters reported more than 
2,200 deaths. Many of these were not recorded 
as victims of the disease (Reuters, 2020 April 
28). The controversial data publication has 
created a false sense of policy: instead of 
preparing for recovery, officials have looked 
for ways to avoid responding. Jokowi has 
defended his administration’s response by 
noting global scientists’ inability to provide 
definitive predictions of the pandemic. 
In collecting official data, the Health 
Ministry of Indonesia initially insisted on 
counting only the polymerase chain reaction 
tests performed by a single facility in Jakarta, 
ignoring the surge in suspected cases and 
positive results from the rapid antibody tests 
conducted by regional authorities. Unconvinced 
by official figures, Reuters pieced data from 
cemeteries, medical records, and Jakarta 
governors’ tallies to reveal that more than 2,200 
suspected patients have died while awaiting 
tests. In a press conference, President Jokowi 
admitted that data was concealed to prevent 
mass panic (Kompas.com, 2020a March 13), 
i.e. to ensure political and economic stability. 
As such, his administration used flawed data 
to defer critical intervention and delayed the 
official declaration of a health emergency for 
several weeks. Finally, on April 24, 2020, the 
government banned most commercial travel 
in a bid to prevent the annual Eid exodus of 
20 million people; however, an estimated 1.6 
million people had already made the journey.
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Discussion
Based on intensive reviews of several 
policies throughout the period of January-
June 2020, the study found that Jokowi’s 
administration prioritized two factors: the 
stability of political power which leads to 
the protection of business in support of his 
political authority. Applying the concepts 
of critical political economy, Jokowi set his 
communication of political events similar to 
that of his election period in which he tried 
to keep a good image through a series of 
risk communication practices. Moreover, he 
mobilized traditional and digital political 
resources to support this action, including social 
media influencers. This policy demonstrates 
Wasko (2014) argument concerning the 
allocation of resources for and within capitalist 
actors, which resulted in marginalizing health 
issues as a necessary public interest. 
Following Hardy (2014), it is apparent 
that Jokowi’s strategy of risk communication 
is motivated by multiple political and 
economic factors. Analyzing several policies 
of COVID-19 at the two levels: presidential and 
ministerial decrees, it can be seen that all risk 
communication policies within the above laws 
are motivated to stabilize the economic climate, 
avoiding the ideal goal of governmental policy 
to prioritize public health protection. 
The study shows that the role of the state in 
the national arena remains strong in protecting 
the sustainability of huge corporations instead 
of reallocating economic resources to the wider 
public. It confirms Karl Marx’s notion of the 
dominance of state-capitalists over society (Obo 
& Coker, 2014), both in the COVID-19 policy, 
orientation, and its practice.  
The prioritization of the economy over 
health, for example, is evident in three areas: 
budget allocation, reluctance to impose a 
strict national lockdown, and selecting digital 
industries to provide social assistance. 
The communication policy indicating the 
prioritization of economic stability is evident 
in the massive campaign of social distancing 
carried out in order to anticipate demands for 
a national lockdown. State funds for social 
assistance were unavailable, and thus large-
scale social restrictions were favored over 
lockdown. President Jokowi stressed that he 
had never considered a lockdown, and forbade 
regional governments from totally closing 
their territories. Jokowi asked people to “slow 
down”, to work from home (WFH), study at 
home, and worship at home.
The real reason for Jokowi’s reluctance to 
impose lockdown (as urged by social activists) 
was likely the shaky state of capital markets. 
Many Indonesians, particularly in the informal 
sector, survive on subsistence wages of $100–
200 per month; if they were to lose that income 
due to lockdown, the effects would be hard 
to predict. Indonesian authorities, therefore, 
waged a public health war against COVID-19 
while using limited financial resources to fight 
off a possible recession and liquidity crisis 
(Guild, 2020).
On March 5, 2020, Jakarta Governor Anies 
Baswedan proposed a lockdown to avoid 
the spread of the pandemic. A day later, he 
reduced the frequency and capacity of public 
transportation systems such as Transjakarta, 
Light Rapid Transit (LRT), and Mass Rapid 
Transit (MRT), resulting in long queues at 
stations and political controversy on social 
media. When acting Minister of Transportation 
Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan rejected this local 
policy, the central government asserted its 
priorities (Tirto.id, 2020 April 1). The Jokowi 
regime thus prioritized its economic agenda 
above the health and welfare of the public. This 
situation can be understood within the context of 
the government’s prioritization of accelerating 
physical infrastructure development and 
alliance with large-scale, digital technology-
based business groups. This orientation is also 
reflected in the involvement of top ministers 
and special staff and has affected the creation 
of public communication strategies. 
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The most controversial policy of the Jokowi 
government was to use digital technology-based 
industries that existed before the pandemic as 
a partner for disseminating ideas, conditioning 
the public mind, and social assistance. For 
example, digital payment companies such as 
GoPay have vigorously sought to increase the 
effectiveness of social assistance (Kania, 2020). 
Similar to how multinational social media 
giants such as Facebook and YouTube profited 
from the chaotic political communication 
during Indonesia’s 2014 and 2019 general 
elections, these companies have employed their 
close alliances with political leaders to profit 
from the COVID-19 crisis. 
Social assistance, particularly the pre-
employment card (kartu pra kerja) program, has 
facilitated two interests: political cronyism and 
industrial survival. After registration was first 
opened on April 11, 2020, the program—and 
its main goal of reducing unemployment—has 
been accelerated to mitigate the economic impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The publication of 
the pre-employment card program may also be 
seen as a form of communication that supports 
the interests of digital corporations, who are 
generally supporters of the Jokowi regime. 
However, this policy contradicts the official 
2020 Work Plan document, which requires a 
professional institution to manage the program 
(Kania, 2020). Likewise, management of the 
program by officials from the Kantor Kepala 
Staff President (Presidential Staff Office/KSP) 
violates the requirement that independent 
experts be involved. 
The appointment of Ruang guru—a 
startup company owned by Belva Devara 
(one of Jokowi’s Special Staff members)—as 
a training partner for the pre-employment 
card program was controversial. Rather than 
clarify its bidding process, through which Rp 
5.6 trillion of the Rp 20 trillion budget went 
to digital training institutions, Coordinating 
Minister for the Economy Airlangga Hartarto 
defended Ruangguru’s inclusion in a series 
of media statements  (Detik.com, 2020 April 
17). Ultimately, this was perceived as political 
cronyism, reflecting similar practices in the 
New Order; as stated in Kunio’s “The Rise of 
Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia” (Kunio, 
1988), entrepreneurial projects during the 
New Order regime accessed the state budget 
through special links with President Soeharto 
and his family. Such practices have endured, 
with Ruangguru and other digital companies 
taking economic advantage of the pandemic 
and enjoying windfalls as online learning and 
other activities have become popular. 
The climax of the Jokowi’s government’s 
prioritization of post-COVID-19 economic 
stability was its decision to expedite the 
passage of two unpopular bills. One was 
the revised criminal code, which faced 
deadly demonstrations in response, and 
the other was the labor deregulation bill 
(Mahy, 2020). It confirms what Sparkes et 
al. (2019) argue that the ruling government 
sought to continue to secure infrastructure 
development and promote macro-economic 
stability rather than ensure citizens’ welfare 
during the pandemic.
This study informs that COVID-19 
pandemic in Indonesia has sparked a political 
feud between incumbents’ supporters and 
opponents. In the United States, the citizens’ 
political orientation has determined how 
they understand and respond to the public 
statements of political authorities (Grossman 
et al., 2020), while in Indonesia, a discursive 
war about COVID-19 has been waged between 
the supporters of Joko Widodo and Jakarta 
Governor Anies Baswedan. Many political 
administrations and their supporters in 
both states have used the pandemic as a 
political proxy. For instance, most of the 
public discourse on the coronavirus in the US 
focuses, for understandable reasons, on just 
how disheartening this is, and what it tells the 
public about the present state of the US political 
polarization:  Republicans vs. Democrats. 
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The same situation is also happening in 
Indonesian politics: Hermawan, (2020) found, 
there has been an attempt to portray those who 
back the idea of imposing a lockdown to counter 
COVID-19 pandemic as kadrun (desert lizards), 
a derogatory term used by Jokowi’s supporters 
to describe detractors, those openly rooting for 
Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan as the next 
president. Even though Baswedan’s Islamist 
allies have urged their followers to cancel 
religious gatherings and postpone travel, the 
president’s supporters have accused them of 
playing politics. In fact, the central government 
has steadily undermined Baswedan’s efforts to 
manage the crisis. Even though Jakarta is the 
nation’s coronavirus epicenter, the requests to 
impose strict social distancing measures were 
repeatedly denied, citing potential economic 
consequences. Even after the declaration of a 
nationwide health emergency, his request was 
held up further by the health minister. Only 
after massive protests and days of haggling 
over data was this request approved.
It is important to note that social media 
buzzers play a key role in garnering support 
or waging a discourse war on social media 
(Howard & Bradshaw, 2019) with COVID-19 as a 
political proxy. Controversy over buzzers arose 
in February 2020, when Jokowi announced his 
idea to involve influencers to spur tourist visits. 
Minister for Tourism Wishnutama (Tempo.
co, 2020 February 26), announced a plan to 
disburse Rp 72 billion in funds to the media 
and digital influencers in return for promoting 
tourism. He explained that this money was part 
of a Rp 298.5 billion stimulus package intended 
to attract foreign tourists, one that also included 
Rp 98.5 billion for airfare subsidies and Rp 103 
billion for commercial advertising. 
From a polit ical  perspective,  the 
involvement of political buzzers to advance 
government agendas may be attributed to 
a general sense of political and economic 
insecurity. Willett (2001) illustrates that every 
country desires a sense of security, one that 
covers more than traditional security (such as 
national defense). The involvement of buzzers 
as communicators during the pandemic 
represents the desire to avoid potential political 
instability and insecurity by advocating the 
central government’s programs over those of 
local governments and political opposition 
groups.
Finally, the predominance of former 
mil i tary e l i tes  in  s teer ing COVID-19 
communication indicates that a security 
approach to communication drove its 
fabrication of pandemic data (Jeffrey, 2020). 
The author observed that all of the persons 
tasked with coordinating Indonesia’s crisis 
response are retired army officers, including 
Doni Munardo (the head of the disaster 
management task force), Achmad Yurianto 
(the national spokesman on the coronavirus 
crisis), Terawan Agus Putranto (the health 
minister), as well as the Minister of Religion, 
the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and 
Investment Affairs, the Minister of Defense, 
and the Chief of Staff. Jokowi’s government has 
the highest concentration of military personnel 
of any cabinet since the fall of Suharto’s 
military dictatorship in 1998, and as such it 
is not surprising that a security approach has 
dominated his response to COVID-19. 
This security and/or political stability 
approach informed the regime’s initial 
response to the COVID-19 outbreak. In March 
2020, Jokowi considered responding to the 
health crisis by declaring a civil emergency 
(darurat sipil), which is legally reserved for 
fighting rebellions and civil war. Although 
such a declaration promoted the imposition of 
large-scale social restrictions, it faced protests 
from various elements of civil society, mainly 
because the policy discourse was considered 
irrelevant and perceived as having the potential 
to violate citizens’ civil and political rights.
Overall,  the Jokowi government’s 
communication policies during the pandemic 
can be understood through the concept of 
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knowledge and power, both of which are 
exclusively his domain. Harold Adams Innis, a 
Canadian political economist, coined the term 
‘knowledge and information mastery’ to refer 
to situations where governments, as the sole 
and strongest actors in the COVID-19 pandemic 
and other crises, monopolize knowledge, data 
and make information exclusive to certain 
groups in order to maintain the stability and/
or instability of political power (Comor, 2001).
Conclusion
This paper overall shows that Jokowi’s 
government positioned COVID-19 as a ‘political 
event’ (Olson & Gawronski, 2010), prioritizing 
economic stability rather than managing public 
health crises. The study has advanced previous 
studies (Wijayanto, 2020) on blunders in 
COVID-19 communication between February 
and May 2020, finding that market-driven 
communication practices have stymied the 
need to protect public health. It also confirms 
Karl Marx’s theory of ‘class-state’ domination 
(Obo & Coker, 2014) over ordinary society. The 
study shows strong state intervention through 
the production of regulatory capitalism (Levi-
Faur, 2009) with the interests of market actors 
being prioritized over those of ordinary people 
in COVID-19 prevention. 
This paper highlights the political 
and politicized discourses surrounding 
COVID-19. It finds that two factors—pro-
market/capitalism communication policies 
and manufactured-politicized COVID-19 
pandemic—have been prominent. Although 
these communication practices are primarily 
used for packaging issues in such a manner 
that secret interests are concealed, this paper 
has uncovered them. The manipulation of the 
pandemic risks has led to increased fatalities 
and pathogenic exposure. 
This paper approves that political 
and economic concerns have impacted the 
communication goals of political authorities, 
including Indonesia. It confirms Bland, (2019) 
claim that Jokowi’s actions remain motivated 
by promoting economic progress, and this 
has caused blunders in communication and 
recovery programs. The government’s risk 
communication policies and public exposure 
have been influenced by the pragmatic 
narratives of political and economic stability 
promoted by political agencies and corporate 
interest groups. In the global arena, these 
strategic narratives are at odds with the 
messaging recommended by the World Health 
Organization and other leading public health 
authorities, creating a conflict of interest 
that has a direct impact on public message 
consumption and public health needs.
This paper finally demonstrates that, in 
this pandemic era, the Jokowi government 
has continued using the same strategies as 
the Suharto regime and prioritized economic 
growth over public welfare. Although Jokowi 
has often been depicted as a “reformer”, and 
has himself played up this idea, he values 
political stability over risk-taking. He has 
always taken a cautious approach to advocate 
for change, even in the economic sphere that 
is most important to him. Jokowi’s formative 
years were spent under the autocratic rule of 
Suharto, who had also prioritized political 
stability and economic growth over public 
transparency and accountability. 
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